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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
radio station owners faced a difficult decision: Should the station limit its 
play list to reflect the nation’s period of turmoil? In the weeks to follow, 
there undoubtedly would be a careful revision of many radio stations’ 
musical choices—sometimes deliberately, sometimes unconsciously. Most 
of these efforts drew little attention. 
One station owner’s actions, however, drew sharp criticism from 
media watchdogs. In the week following the terrorist attacks, an e-mail 
rumor began that Clear Channel Communications had developed a list of 
approximately 150 potentially inappropriate songs, which was circulated 
among its staff in an attempt temporarily to “ban” the songs from its play 
lists.1 Clear Channel’s official statement is that no songs were ever 
“banned,” and that the company simply suggested in an internal memo that 
its staff members be sensitive to their audience’s mood during a time of 
national mourning.2 
Even if the memo was simply a suggestion to tastefully limit play 
lists, there were several reasons for the outcry. Primarily, critics questioned 
whether some of the alleged songs on the list were truly “lyrically 
inappropriate,” including John Lennon’s “Imagine” and the Bangles’ 
“Walk Like an Egyptian.”3 Underlying this criticism, however, was the fact 
that Clear Channel is a media conglomerate that owns approximately one 
out of every ten U.S. radio stations and has more than 110 million 
listeners.4 Whether the list was misguided and the circumstances extreme, 
listeners ultimately became angry that Clear Channel had the ability to 
manipulate the entire nation’s listening habits with a carefully worded fax. 
 
 
 
 1. Douglas Wolk, And the Banned Play On, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 26, 2001, at 60, 
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0139/wolk.php. 
 2. Steve Jones, No. 1 Radio Chain Didn’t Ban Songs, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2001, at 
4D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/2001-09-20-song-list.htm#more; see 
also Press Release, Clear Channel Communications, Clear Channel Says National “Banned 
Playlist” Does Not Exist (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.clearchannel.com/ 
documents/press_releases/NationalBannedPlaylist.pdf. 
 3. Eliza Truitt, It’s the End of the World as Clear Channel Knows It, SLATE, Sept. 17, 
2001, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=1008314. 
 4. Clear Channel Communications Web site, at http://www.clearchannel.com/ 
radio/index.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2002). 
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“Mega-owners” such as Clear Channel became possible with the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act),5 which radically deregulated 
national and local radio station ownership limits that had been in existence 
for almost sixty years.6 The 1996 Act reflected Congress’s firm belief that a 
deregulated marketplace would best serve the public interest, as suggested 
by the Act’s preface, which described its purpose as: “[t]o promote 
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and 
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and 
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications 
technologies.”7 
This Note argues that the 1996 Act is an example of excessive 
adherence to the marketplace model, particularly for regulating the radio 
industry. From the time that the Federal Communication Commission 
(“FCC” or “Commission”) was created until the early 1980s, the 
Commission regulated radio based on the trusteeship model, “whereby 
broadcast stations were entrusted by the government to operate in the 
public interest” based upon specific guidelines.8 This changed in 1981, 
when the Commission began to deregulate the industry and implemented a 
marketplace model, under which the market would determine the public 
interest.9 Although a less extreme marketplace model has guided the FCC’s 
regulation of radio since the early 1980s, the current incarnation of the 
marketplace model is both contrary to the public interest and economically 
harmful for radio stations and industries affected by radio, such as 
advertising. Part II of this Note describes the theoretical bases and history 
of radio station ownership regulation, including the trusteeship model and 
the marketplace model of regulation. Part III of this Note describes the 
marketplace model’s negative effect on diversity of ownership in the radio 
industry. Part IV gives an analysis of these effects, linking decreased 
diversity of station ownership with harm to the public interest. 
 
 
 
 
 5. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 6. Implementation of Sections 202(a) and 202(b)(1) of the Telecomms. Act of 1996 
(Brdcst. Radio Ownership), Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 12368, paras. 2-3, 2 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 
376 (1996). 
 7. 110 Stat. at 56. 
 8. Benjamin J. Bates & Todd Chambers, The Economic Basis for Radio Deregulation, 
12 J. MEDIA ECON. 19, 22 (1999). 
 9. Id. at 23. 
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II.  HISTORY OF OWNERSHIP REGULATION OF RADIO STATIONS 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 
To understand the magnitude of the changes that the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 has wrought on the radio industry, it is 
important to track the changes in radio regulation since it was first 
regulated in the early twentieth century. First, this Note will examine the 
policy justifications behind radio regulation; then, it will examine the 
regulations themselves, including limitations on local ownership, national 
ownership, and the concurrent ownership of radio stations and other media 
such as newspapers or television stations. 
A. Policy Justifications 
Radio is unique in that it is the first broadcast medium that the federal 
government controlled by regulations.10 Radio regulation was first based on 
the proposition that airwaves were a public resource that was exploited for 
the “public interest” by those granted the “privilege” by the federal 
government.11 However, over the past twenty years, the concept of the 
“public interest” has become malleable, changing from a trusteeship model 
in the 1930s to today’s marketplace model.12 The most recent radio 
regulatory legislation, the 1996 Act, is yet another extension of that 
marketplace model, but much more far-reaching. To understand the 
detrimental effects of the 1996 Act’s deregulatory scheme, it is important 
to review the trusteeship model under which the courts and the FCC 
worked for the first fifty years of the Commission’s existence. 
1. The Early Years and the Trusteeship Model 
The first radio regulations were promulgated in the early 1900s to 
prevent overlapping frequencies and signal confusion at a time when radio 
was used primarily as a safety device.13 The Radio Act of 1912 gave the 
Secretary of Commerce the right to resolve such signal disputes by 
licensing; however, a decade later, the ineffectiveness of this Act was 
apparent.14 The burden of overseeing radio licensing had become too much 
 
 10. Richard R. Zaragoza et al., The Public Interest Concept Transformed: The 
Trusteeship Model Gives Way to a Marketplace Approach, in PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE 
BUSINESS OF BROADCASTING 27 (Jon T. Powell & Wally Gair eds., 1988). 
 11. Id. at 28. 
 12. Id. at 30. 
 13. Michael Ortner, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Serving a Different 
Master—The Decline of Diversity and the Public Interest in American Radio in the Wake of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 139, 140-141 (2000). 
 14. Id. at 141. 
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for the Commerce Department, and many unlicensed commercial radio 
stations began to appear.15 In addition, several court cases 
successfullychallenged the right of the Secretary to become involved in 
radio regulation.16 
In 1927, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover called several 
national conferences aimed at managing this situation; these conferences 
resulted in the Radio Act of 1927 (1927 Act)17, and the creation of the 
National Radio Commission.18 This Commission had the power “to 
regulate all public and private radio transmissions,” including granting 
licenses and setting hours and frequencies.19 For the first time, the 1927 Act 
maintained the public’s rights over those of broadcasters by declaring that 
the broadcasters serve “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”20 Seven 
years later, the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act)21 merged the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Radio Commission to 
create the Federal Communications Commission.22 The industry-supported 
1934 Act was designed to “preserve the developing broadcasting industry 
and protect the interests of existing stations.”23 Congress passed the 1934 
Act under the assumption that the radio spectrum would stay primarily 
commercial; in fact, the 1934 Act stipulated “that the broadcasting industry 
would not be a governmental operation.”24 The 1934 Act, however, did 
contain some limitations on the ownership and transfer of broadcast 
licenses.25 The 1934 Act explained the need for regulation of a privately 
owned commercial resource by redefining the airwaves as a scarce public 
resource; as such, this public resource required oversight.26 “A second, 
largely unstated basis for regulation was fear of the potential power of 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 141 n.11. One of these decisions was United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 
F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). Ortner writes that the Zenith court “ruled that the Secretary of 
Commerce did not have the statutory power to assign wavelengths and hours of operation to 
radio broadcast license-holders.” Id. 
 17. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. 
 18. Ortner, supra note 13, at 141, 142. 
 19. Id. at 142. 
 20. Id. (citing Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166) (“The licensing 
authority, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the 
limitation of this Act, shall grant to any applicant therefor [sic] a station license provided for 
by this Act.”). 
 21. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064. 
 22. Ortner, supra note 13, at 144. 
 23. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 22. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Ortner, supra note 13, at 144. 
 26. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 22. 
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broadcasters, both in terms of political power and economic power.”27 The 
FCC’s regulation of a public resource (the airwaves) being used by private 
individuals was touted as the “trusteeship” model, whereby the government 
entrusted broadcasters with the airwaves to use in a manner consistent with 
the public interest.28 
Originally, regulators had difficulty defining the “public interest” 
under the trusteeship model. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 
the Supreme Court attempted to define the public interest in accordance 
with the 1934 Act as “the interest of the listening public in ‘the larger and 
more effective use of radio.’”29 However, in FCC v. RCA Communications, 
Inc., the Court altered its previous opinion and accepted the FCC’s power 
to define the “public interest” on a case-by-case basis.30 Although the 
“public interest” was ill-defined by case law, the FCC developed a number 
of content and structural regulations to ensure that broadcasters acted 
according to the public interest standard.31 Content regulations included 
requirements that stations devote a certain amount of broadcast time to 
nonentertainment programming, as well as “community ascertainment” 
rules that “required broadcasters to familiarize themselves with the needs 
and interests of their communities.”32 Structural regulations included 
limiting the number of stations a single entity could own, preferring to 
license those having fewer broadcast interests, and encouraging minority 
participation in broadcasting.33 As discussed infra, first the content 
regulations then the structural regulations were eliminated under the 
marketplace model. 
The Commission received support for its efforts to structurally 
regulate broadcasting in FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.,34 when the 
Court clearly stated that marketplace competition is not sufficient to 
maintain the public interest: 
 
 
 27. Id. (citation omitted). 
 28. Id. 
 29. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (citation omitted). See also Bates 
& Chambers, supra note 8, at 22. 
 30. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 22; FCC v. RCA Comm., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90-
91 (1953). 
 31. Review of the Comm’n’s Regs. Governing TV Brdcst., Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, para. 57, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2005 (1995) [hereinafter 
Television Broadcasting Review]. 
 32. Id. para. 58. These rules were constitutionally problematic in that they placed the 
FCC in the difficult position of “assess[ing] licensee responsiveness to community needs” 
without violating the First Amendment. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 29. 
 33. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, at para. 60. 
 34. 346 U.S. at 93-94. 
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[A]s to the industry before us in this case, there has been serious 
qualification of competition as the regulating mechanism. The very 
fact that Congress has seen fit to enter into the comprehensive 
regulation of communications embodied in the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 contradicts the notion that national 
policy unqualifiedly favors competition in communications. . . . Of 
course, the fact that there is substantial regulation does not preclude 
the regulatory agency from drawing on competition for complementary 
or auxiliary support. Satisfactory accommodation of the peculiarities of 
individual industries to the demands of the public interest necessarily 
requires in each case a blend of private forces and public 
intervention.35 
Thus, the trusteeship model did not equate the “public interest” with 
economic competition. In this case, the FCC was to grant licenses only if 
there was a “reasonable expectation that competition may have some 
beneficial effect” such as “maintaining good service and improving it.”36 
Economic efficiency could only factor into the equation as a supporting 
force, not a guiding principal.37 
2. The Marketplace Model 
The trusteeship model, which used both direct content regulations and 
indirect structural regulations to maintain radio’s public interest mandate, 
was the primary framework for broadcast regulation until the early 1980s, 
when it was replaced with the marketplace model.38 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Commission started proposing a shift 
away from the trusteeship model for radio regulation,39 and began using an 
economic/marketplace model for broadcast regulation in 1981.40 The 
marketplace model did not replace the public interest standard; rather, it 
attempted to meet the public interest standard through market forces.41 
Under this model, licensees are “marketplace participants,” rather than the 
holders of a public trust, and “market forces rather than [FCC] judgments 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 97. 
 37. Id. at 93 n.4: 
We need not in this case attempt to suggest with any precision where the balance 
is struck. Certainly the presence of §§ 313 and 314 in the Act, prohibiting certain 
restrictions on competition, indicates the relevance of some competitive criteria, 
although it hardly directs the Commission to rely on “competition.” 
 38. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 30; Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 22-23. 
 39. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 19-20. 
 40. Id. at 23. The FCC, however, did not state that it was relying purely on the 
economic/marketplace model at the time. Deregulation of Radio (Part 1 of 2), Report and 
Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, App. D, para. 1, 49 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1 (1981) [hereinafter 
Deregulation of Radio]. 
 41. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 40, para. 3. 
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on program service . . . determine where the public interest lies in 
broadcasting.”42 Furthermore, the marketplace model finds scarcity of 
spectrum space “irrelevant” to the First Amendment analysis of 
broadcasting.43 This is because “[b]y definition, all resources are scarce;”44 
in essence, the radio spectrum is no different from the limited amount of 
newsprint that can be manufactured for the printing of newspapers.45 
Under the marketplace model, radio stations still have a public 
interest mandate. The model, however, assumes that broadcasters will 
inherently act in the public interest by adjusting their content to satisfy their 
audience’s preferences.46 A broadcaster that does not satisfy consumer 
needs will lose profits.47 Content regulation is not only useless under the 
marketplace model, it is actually harmful because any regulatory 
interference from the FCC based on content guidelines would “deny the 
American consumer maximum satisfaction from the medium.”48 
Accordingly, the FCC dropped much of its direct regulation of 
programming content.49 
During the shift from the trusteeship model to the marketplace model, 
traditional liberals and market-oriented conservatives vigorously offered 
arguments for and against the new paradigm.50 Liberals argued that 
marketplace forces would not adequately protect the public interest, 
primarily because there was still ownership monopoly over the spectrum.51 
Conservatives and libertarians argued that there was an excess of spectrum, 
and that the primary concern should be to develop it; furthermore, new 
media options—such as videocassettes and cable—were offering 
consumers further entertainment and information options.52 Thus, the 
 
 42. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 30 (quoting Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, 
A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 209, 233 (1982)). 
 43. Id. “Admittedly, there are not unlimited broadcast outlets. But that kind of 
‘economic scarcity’ does not justify content regulation.” Id. at 45 n.43 (citing FCC 
Chairman Mark S. Fowler’s Testimony before the Subcommittee on Communications, 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on March 18, 1987). 
 44. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 24. 
 45. Amendment of Section 73.35555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of 
the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, 
Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, para. 7, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 859 (1984). 
 46. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 30. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, para. 9, 49 Rad. Reg.2d 
(P & F) 1 (1981) (proceeding terminated); Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 31. 
 50. Patricia Aufderheide, Shifting Policy Paradigms and the Public Interest in the U.S. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 2 COMM. REV. 259, 263 (1997). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
BEDNARSKI MACX 3/6/2003  9:17 AM 
Number 2] FAILURE OF MARKETPLACE MODEL 281 
public interest in programming diversity was being adequately served by 
new technology.53 However, the theory that more entertainment outlets 
would result in programming diversity was premised on the fact that station 
ownership within markets would remain regulated to prevent local 
monopolies.54 
Marketplace forces eventually won the battle, and the trusteeship 
model’s regulation of broadcast content unraveled under the new 
marketplace model. As Mark Fowler, FCC Chairman at the time, noted, 
“the language of the [F]irst [A]mendment protects the right of speech, not 
the right of access to ideas or even the right to listen. The direct concern of 
the [F]irst [A]mendment is with the active speaker, not the passive 
receiver.”55 One of the clearest indications of the government’s shift to a 
marketplace model, at least before the passage of the 1996 Act, was the 
abolition of the “fairness doctrine.” Under this doctrine, broadcasters had a 
duty to “afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting 
views on issues of public importance.”56 
The 1996 Act’s most important provisions (as applied to radio) deal 
with the structural regulations still left from the trusteeship model, rather 
than content regulation, which had been effectively eliminated by the time 
of its passage. Although the elimination of structural regulations may seem 
to be the next logical step in moving fully to the marketplace model, it is 
unclear that the new legislation has proved itself to be in the public interest 
or effective in achieving the stated goal of the 1996 Act: cheaper, better-
quality radio media for American “consumers.”57 
B. Regulation History 
Before 1996, the FCC mandated three types of structural limits on 
radio station ownership: multiple station ownership in the same market; 
multiple station ownership nationally; and ownership of both a radio and 
television station in the same market, or the “one-to-a-market” rule.58 The 
 
 53. Id. At the FCC’s inception in 1934, the nation had 583 radio stations; by 1981, the 
number of stations had grown to almost 9000. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 40,  
para. 2. 
 54. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 24. 
 55. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 45 n.40 (citing Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. 
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 237-38 
(1982)). 
 56. Id. at 33 (citing Pub. L. No. 66-274, Sec. 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U.S.C. § 
315(a) (1934)). The fairness doctrine was effectively abolished by Complaint of Syracuse 
Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 63 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 
541 (1987). 
 57. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 58. Jill Howard, Congress Errs in Deregulating Broadcast Ownership Caps: More 
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1996 Act required significant deregulation in each area, resulting in more 
opportunities for the ownership of multiple radio stations by a single entity. 
1. Multiple-Station Ownership in the Same Market 
The FCC has regulated ownership of two or more radio stations in a 
single market, also known as a duopoly, for more than sixty years. In 1938, 
the Commission issued its first decision denying a license that would result 
in a duopoly.59 In a strongly worded statement, the Commission declared: 
[T]o permit the entry into the field of [a duopoly] might well, from an 
economic standpoint, prevent the future entry into the field by an 
applicant who would offer a new, different, improved and competitive 
service. . . . [T]he Commission will grant duplicate facilities to 
substantially identical interests only in cases where it overwhelmingly 
appears that the facility, apart from any benefit to the business interests 
of the applicant, is for the benefit of the community, fulfilling a need 
which cannot otherwise be fulfilled.60 
This “diversification of service” rationale indicates that the Commission 
believed a greater number of owners in any one area would result in a 
greater diversification of programming.61 In 1940, the FCC formally 
banned duopolies in FM radio; and in 1943, it did the same for AM radio.62 
The duopoly rule has remained constant for many years, even during 
the mid-1980s when the Commission began to liberalize national 
ownership restrictions.63 However, the Commission loosened the duopoly 
rule in 1992,64 citing an explosion of radio stations in most markets, as well 
as economic woes that made it imperative for radio stations to share 
resources such as “facilities, managerial and clerical staffs, sales, 
bookkeeping, promotion, production, news and other aspects of station  
 
 
Monopolies, Less Localism, Decreased Diversity and Violations of Equal Protection, 5 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 269, 270 (1997). 
 59. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, para. 4 (citing Genesee Radio 
Corp., Order, 5 F.C.C. 183 (1938)). 
 60. Genesee Radio Corp., Order, 5 F.C.C. 183, 186-87 (1938). 
 61. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, para. 4. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Howard, supra note 58, at 273. However, while duopolies were generally banned 
between 1938 and 1992, the definition of a duopoly changed during this period. Between 
1943 and 1964, there was no fixed technological definition of a duopoly; rather, each 
potential duopoly was evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 273 n.48. In 1964, the FCC 
changed its definition of a duopoly so that a single entity could not own two stations with 
overlapping 1 mV/m contours. Id. The FCC further modified the standard in 1989, when it 
barred a single entity from owning two AM stations or two FM stations with overlapping 
contours of 5 mV/m and 3.16 mV/m, respectively. Id. 
 64. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, para. 4. 
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operation.”65 At that time, the FCC was looking for a solution to an 
increasingly fragmented radio market with revenue growth that had 
dropped to one-tenth the annual growth rate of the Gross National Product 
from 1985 to 1990.66 Furthermore, there was evidence that stations in 
smaller markets were “highly leveraged in anticipation of increased 
profits;” in addition, stations were cutting their staffs, which challenged 
their ability to produce news programming.67 The FCC concluded from this 
evidence that “radio stations could not meet their public interest mandate if 
they could not make a profit.”68 Approving a limited number of duopolies 
in certain markets would allow stations to combine operations to reduce 
staff and other similar costs, thereby keeping the stations open and actually 
promoting program diversity.69 
The final result of the liberalized duopoly rule was a two-tiered 
approach: (1) in a market of fifteen or more stations, a single entity could 
own up to two FM and two AM stations if their combined audience share 
was less than 25%;70 (2) in a market of fourteen or fewer stations, the new 
scheme allowed common ownership of up to three stations, only two of 
which could be in one service, AM or FM—in addition, no entity could 
own more than 50% of the stations within the market (also known as the 
“50% rule”).71 
The 1996 Act increased the two-tiered market system to a multitiered 
system. It also allowed an entity to own more stations in a single market, as 
well as more stations in a single service. Table 1 illustrates the results of 
the 1996 Act.72 The 50% rule for markets of fourteen stations or less still 
applies under the 1996 Act.73 
 
 65. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, paras. 
34-37, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 903 (1992) [hereinafter Revision of Radio Rules]. 
 66. Id. para. 7. 
 67. Wenmouth Williams, Jr., The Impact of Ownership Rules and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 on a Small Radio Market, 5 J. RADIO STUD. 8, 10 (1998). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Howard, supra note 58, at 273. 
 71. Id. at 274 n.52 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1) (1995)). 
 72. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(a)-(b)(1), 110 Stat. 
56, 111 (1996). 
 73. Id. § 202(b)(1)(D), 110 Stat. at 110. 
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TABLE 1.  LIMITS ON OWNERSHIP OF COMMERCIAL STATIONS 
Market Size 
(Number 
of Stations) 
Maximum Number  
of Stations Owned  
by a Single Party 
Maximum Number of 
Stations in a Single Service 
Owned by a Single Party 
45 or more 8 5 
30-44 7 4 
15-29 6 4 
14 or less 5 3 
2. Multiple-Station Ownership Nationally 
The FCC originally began requiring national ownership limits at 
about the same time that it began imposing local ownership limits.74 The 
national ownership provisions mandated that a current license holder could 
possess a second license only if “the applicant could demonstrate that the 
issuance of the license (1) would have a pro-competitive impact, and (2) 
would not result in the concentration of control of broadcasting facilities in 
a manner inconsistent with the public interest.”75 
In 1940, the FCC imposed an absolute limit of six FM stations under 
common control.76 National ownership of AM stations, however, went 
unregulated until 1946, when the FCC denied CBS an application for an 
eighth AM station, thereby imposing a de facto limit of seven AM 
stations.77 Significantly, the CBS decision came on the heels of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Associated Press v. United States, which 
stated that the First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”78 
Several years later, in 1953, the Commission made official the de 
facto seven-station AM limit and raised the FM station limit from six to 
 
 74. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, para. 2. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (citing Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Brdcst. Stations, 5 Fed. 
Reg. 2382, 2384 (June 26, 1940)). 
 77. Id. (citing Sherwood B. Brunton, Decision, 11 F.C.C. 407, 3 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 291 
(1946)). 
The FCC did not impose an absolute limit on AM station ownership as it held 
that, with respect to AM, concentration of control “is not a factor of the absolute 
number of stations alone but depends also upon the character of the facilities 
involved, e.g., the powers and the frequencies of the stations.” 
Howard, supra note 58, at 270 n.21 (citing Sherwood B. Brunton, Decision, 11 F.C.C. 407, 
413, 3 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 291, 298 (1946)). 
 78. Howard, supra note 52, at 270 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 
20 (1945)). 
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seven.79 These new limits were known as the Rule of Seven.80 The rationale 
for the Rule of Seven was twofold—“to promote diversification of 
ownership in order to maximize diversification of program and service 
viewpoints as well as to prevent any undue concentration of economic 
power contrary to the public interest.”81 
It took the FCC more than three decades to make any significant 
changes in national radio station ownership caps, and initial proposals were 
drastic. In 1984, the Commission called for a complete elimination of 
national ownership caps by 1990.82 The 1984 order stated that because the 
duopoly rule was in place, the local market would still be available to 
promote viewpoint diversity, and that a wide variety of sources, including 
newspapers and cable, were helping individual communities achieve this 
diversity.83 The Commission, additionally, maintained that the “Rule of 
Seven” was no longer necessary to deal with radio’s scarcity of outlets and 
“unique power” to influence and persuade because of the astronomical 
increases in the total number of radio stations.84 Moreover, the Commission 
directly challenged the idea that group ownership resulted in a “monolithic 
editorial viewpoint” and less issue-oriented programming, citing a study in 
which the National Association of Broadcasters concluded that there were 
bigger news departments and more public service programming on group-
owned stations.85 Thus, the Commission actually equated group ownership 
with diversity of programming. 
In 1985, after receiving eight petitions from the radio industry 
requesting that the FCC review the 1984 decision, the FCC decided that 
total deregulation was unnecessary and that it would limit ownership to a 
modest twelve AM or twelve FM stations nationally.86 Six years later, 
 
 79. Further Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, at para. 2. 
 80. Howard, supra note 58, at 271 (citing Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 
3.636 of the Rules and Regs. Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and TV Brdcst. 
Stations, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, para. 17, 9 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1563 (1953). 
 81. Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240, and 3.636 of the Rules and Regs. Relating to 
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, 
para. 10, 9 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1563 (1953), cited in Howard, supra note 58, at 271. 
 82. Howard, supra note 58, at 271 (citing Amendment of Section 73.35555 (formerly 
Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership 
of AM, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, paras. 109-110, 
56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 859 (1984)). 
 83. Amendment of Section 73.35555 (formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of 
the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and TV Brdcst. Stations, 
Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, para. 108, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 859 (1984). 
 84. Id. paras. 7-8. 
 85. Id. paras. 9, 45-47. 
 86. Howard, supra note 58, at 271 (citing Amendment of Section 73.35555 (formerly 
Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership 
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while it was considering loosening the duopoly rules in the face of dismal 
radio profits in the late 1980s, the FCC reconsidered national caps yet 
again. In 1994, this resulted in a limit of twenty AM and twenty FM 
stations.87 With the relaxation of the duopoly and national ownership rules, 
as well as the end of the recession of the early 1990s, most of the radio 
industry had returned to profitability by the passage of the 1996 Act.88 
The 1996 Act performed an about-face on the FCC’s previous efforts 
to carefully balance diversity and economics. The Act completely 
eliminated any national limits on radio station ownership—a feat that was 
not achieved earlier due to industry protest in 1984.89 As in 1984, Congress 
cited the public’s access to alternate media outlets (this time including 
satellite radio) as well as the increase in the number of radio stations in 
operation (which was then at 11,000) to prove that radio ownership was not 
in need of national-level regulation.90 
3. The One-to-a-Market Rule 
The FCC’s duopoly rule did not prevent an entity from owning both a 
television and radio station in the same market. In 1970, however, the 
Commission, citing concerns for diversity and competition, adopted the 
“one-to-a-market” rule that prevented such ownership arrangements.91 An 
increase in broadcasting outlets over twenty years and the realization that 
common ownership does not equal common viewpoints led the 
Commission to allow waivers of the one-to-a-market rule under certain 
conditions.92 The 1996 Act instructed the FCC to extend favored status to 
mergers in the top fifty markets, where previously favored status was only 
granted to the top twenty-five markets.93 Later, the FCC further relaxed its 
one-to-a-market rule to permit a single owner to possess up to two 
 
of AM, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74, 
para. 53, 57 Rad. Reg.2d 966 (1985)). 
 87. Id. at 271-72 (citing Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Second Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7183, para. 5, 76 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 698 (1994)). This 
final decision was not without controversy. The FCC initially decided that the limit would 
be thirty AM or thirty FM stations; months later, however, the limits were dropped to 
eighteen stations for each service, which then increased to twenty by 1994. Id. at 271-72 
n.34 (citing Revision of Radio Rules, supra note 59, para. 23; Revision of Radio Rules and 
Policies, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 
F.C.C.R. 6387, paras. 10, 70, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 227 (1992)). 
 88. Bruce E. Drushel, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Radio Market 
Structure, 11 J. MEDIA ECON. 3, 5 (1998). 
 89. Howard, supra note 58, at 271, 275. 
 90. Id. at 275 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-23 (1995)). 
 91. Id. at 274 (citation omitted). 
 92. Id. (citation omitted). 
 93. Id. at 276 (citation omitted). 
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television stations and six radio stations, depending on how many 
“independently owned media ‘voices’” would exist after the transaction.94 
III.  EFFECTS ON STATION OWNERSHIP 
The 1996 Act radically redefined the “marketplace” upon which the 
FCC relied to maintain the public interest standard in broadcasting. The 
most startling change to the radio marketplace has been an extreme 
consolidation of station ownership by larger and larger corporations.95 The 
buying and selling of radio stations became a virtual free-for-all after the 
passage of the 1996 Act, as approximately $700 million in transactions 
took place within the first week after its passage.96 In fact, Radio & 
Records’ first issue after the 1996 Act proclaimed, “Let the deals begin!” 
and “It’s buy, sell, or get out of the way.”97 
Most radio station owners did not simply “get out of the way” of the 
1996 Act’s profit-making opportunity. The ensuing months showed an 
impressive number of station transactions, many of which decreased, rather 
than increased, the overall number of radio station owners. The FCC’s most 
recent call for comment on local radio ownership rules noted that at the 
time of the 1996 Act’s passage, there were approximately 5,100 owners of 
commercial radio stations nationwide; at the end of 2001, there were 
approximately 3,800 owners, a decrease of 25%.98 This decrease occurred 
even though the total number of stations was at a “robust” 12,932 in June 
2001.99 In fact, in March 1996, “an Arbitron metro market had an average 
of 13.5 owners; in March 2001, the average was 10.3, a decrease of 
22%.”100 
The loosening of the local ownership rules only increased the local 
consolidation trend that began in the early 1990s with the changes in the 
duopoly rule and the rise of “local marketing agreements.”101 However, the 
 
 94. Review of the Comm’n’s Regs. Governing TV Brdcst. TV Satellite Stations Review 
of Policy and Rules, 66 Fed. Reg. 9039, 9040 (Feb. 6, 2001) (codified at 47 C.F.R.  
§ 73.3555 (2001)). 
 95. See generally Todd Chambers, Losing Owners: Deregulation and Small Radio 
Markets, 8 J. RADIO STUD. 292 (2001); Drushel, supra note 88. 
 96. Todd L. Wirth, Nationwide Format Oligopolies, 8 J. RADIO STUD. 249, 251 (2001) 
(citations omitted). 
 97. Ed Shane, The State of the Industry: Radio’s Shifting Paradigm, 5 J. RADIO STUD. 1, 
1 (1998). 
 98. Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Brdcst. Stations in 
Local Mkts., and Definition of Radio Mkts., 66 Fed. Reg. 63,986, 63,990 (FCC Dec. 11, 
2001) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) [hereinafter Multiple Ownership Rules]. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Wirth, supra note 96, at 250 (citing Linwood Hagin, Radio Consolidation: 
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national radio market changed dramatically, resulting in a number of 
“mega-owners”—owners of national conglomerates of radio stations. Clear 
Channel, the originator of the September 11 list, now owns at least 1376 
radio stations as a result of transactions mostly completed since the 1996 
Act.102 While the number of stations Clear Channel owns is unusually 
large, there are other similar, but smaller, radio conglomerates: Infinity 
Broadcasting Corp. owns approximately 180 radio stations,103 and Citadel 
Communications Corp. at least 205 stations.104 
The effect of this consolidation on small market radio ownership has 
been particularly acute. One study found that, although the shift from the 
trusteeship model to the marketplace model in the early 1980s had a neutral 
or positive effect on the number of local owners in metropolitan markets of 
125,000 residents or less, the 1996 Act ushered in dramatic ownership 
changes for these markets, including a decrease of local.105 
Additionally, ownership consolidation has had a sweeping effect on 
the ownership of certain radio station formats. A study of fourteen different 
radio formats found that ten of the fourteen were at the threshold of 
becoming oligopolies based on the ownership concentration of each 
format.106 Four companies—Chancellor Media, Clear Channel, Infinity, 
and Capstar—own a majority of stations that play some of the nation’s 
most popular formats: Top 40, Country, Oldies, and Soft Rock/Lite 
Rock/Soft Adult Contemporary/Lite Adult Contemporary.107 
Nevertheless, even if the consolidation of owners in a particular 
market or format is troublesome, the number of station owners per market 
or per station format does not offer an adequate picture of the health of the 
radio industry. A recent study by media researcher Bruce Drushel uses 
audience share as a measure of market concentration: “Audience share . . . 
 
Applications of National Trends, Paper Presented at 42nd Annual Broadcast Education 
Conference (Apr. 4, 1997)). 
 102. Clear Channel Web site, at http://www.clearchannel.com/ci_oh.php (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2002). 
 103. Infinity Broadcasting Corp.’s Web site, at http://www.infinityradio.com (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2002). 
 104. Press Release, Citadel Communications Corp., Farid Suleman, CEO of Infinity 
Broadcasting, Joins Forstmann Little as Special Limited Partner also Named Chief 
Executive Officer of Citadel Communications (Feb. 20, 2002), at 
http://www.citadelbroadcasting.com/press/pr_full.cfm?press_ID=93. 
 105. Chambers, supra note 95, at 306-07, 310. 
 106. See Wirth, supra note 96, at 255. The “traditional thresholds for concern that 
concentration is leading to oligopolistic or monopolistic activities that will harm the 
economic marketplace have been when the top four firms control more than 50% of a 
market.” Id. at 254 (citation omitted). 
 107. Id. at 255. 
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provides a measure of potential revenue, sources of data are readily 
available, and the data are comparable market to market.”108 Using 
audience share as a measure of ownership power also allows the use of an 
important antitrust investigation tool, the Hirschman-Herfindhal Index 
(“HHI”), which measures ownership concentration by summing the squares 
of the market shares of each of the owners in a given market. An HHI of 
less than 1000 is considered unconcentrated, whereas an HHI greater than 
1800 is considered heavily concentrated. Drushel studied the HHI for the 
top fifty U.S. radio markets from 1992 through 1997. He found these 
markets shifted from being unconcentrated (0 to 999) in 1992 to being 
moderately concentrated (1000 to 1799) in 1997.109 This data only includes 
concentration occurring after the 1992 relaxing of the duopoly rule; it does 
not yet include adequate data regarding changes resulting from the 1996 
Act’s further deregulation of national and local ownership. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The FCC has stated numerous times that its regulations should be 
guided by two goals: diversity and competition.110 It is then appropriate to 
use the FCC’s diversity and competition framework to assess whether the 
current move toward ownership consolidation caused by the 1996 Act is 
meeting the FCC’s goals. 
A. Diversity Analysis 
The FCC’s diversity analysis focuses on three types: viewpoint, 
outlet, and source.111 Viewpoint diversity is concerned with whether “the 
media reflect a wide range of diverse and antagonistic opinions and 
interpretations.”112 Outlet diversity assures that “a variety of delivery 
services (e.g., broadcast stations, newspapers, cable and DBS [direct 
broadcast satellite]) [are offering] . . . programming directly to the 
public.113 Source diversity means maintaining a variety of producers and 
owners of information and programming sources—essentially, it is 
 
 108. Drushel, supra note 88, at 10. 
 109. Id. at 13. 
 110. Brdcst. Servs.; Radio Stations, TV Stations, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,333, 43,334 (FCC July 
13, 2000) (biennial review of broadcast ownership rules). See also Brdcst. Servs.; Radio 
Stations, TV Stations, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,353, 15,354 (FCC Mar. 31, 1998) (soliciting 
comment for review of broadcast ownership rules) [hereinafter Review of Rules]; Brdcst. 
Servs.; TV Stations, 60 Fed. Reg. 6490, 6494 (FCC Feb. 2, 1995) (further notice of 
proposed rulemaking). 
 111. Review of Rules, supra note 110, at 15,354. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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ownership diversity.114 While outlet diversity stayed the same or improved 
since the 1996 Act,115 and source (ownership) diversity has clearly 
decreased in that same period,116 the question remains whether the decrease 
in source diversity has negatively affected viewpoint diversity in either 
radio, entertainment, or news content. 
For much of the FCC’s history, viewpoint diversity and source 
diversity were considered the same, particularly source diversity within one 
market.117 This assumption rests on traditional market principles—the more 
providers of a service, the more diversity of products and the lower the 
price (or in this case, because the radio “consumer” pays nothing, lower 
advertising costs). However, some skeptics of this approach offer a 
different picture of the radio market, at least for entertainment 
programming. They theorize that source consolidation within the local 
market results in more niche programming because a provider will avoid 
competing against itself. For instance, an owner of five radio stations in the 
same community would operate the stations as five different formats 
(country, rock, talk, sports, and oldies, for example) in order to attract five 
distinct audiences, and thus control a larger audience share overall.118 
 
 114. Id. at 15,354-55. 
 115. Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 98, at 63,990. The Commission, calling the 
current media marketplace “robust,” offered the following figures: In 2001, there were 
12,932 radio stations; 1678 full-power television stations; 2396 low-power television 
stations; 232 Class A TV stations; and 7 national commercial television broadcast networks. 
Additionally, in 2000, daily newspaper circulation was 55.8 million; cable television 
systems served 67.4% of television households; and 56% of Americans had access to the 
Internet from their homes. Id. 
 116. See Section III infra. 
 117. See Brdcst. Servs.; Radio Stations, TV Stations, supra note 110, at 43,334 
(“Diversity of ownership fosters diversity of viewpoints, and thus advances core First 
Amendment principles. As the Supreme Court has said, the First Amendment ‘rests on the 
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public . . .’” (Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). See also Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 
73.636 of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and TV 
Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, para. 3, 2 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1588 
(1964) (“[T]he greater the diversity of ownership in a particular area, the less chance there is 
that a single person or group can have an inordinate effect, in a political, editorial, or similar 
programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level.”); Amendment of Sections 
73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of 
Standard, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, para. 99, 32 
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 954 (1975) (“Early in its history, the Commission acted to adopt rules 
to end common ownership of stations in the same service serving substantially the same 
area. Needless to say, such commonly owned stations could neither be true competitors nor 
could they offer true diversity.”). 
 118. Drushel, supra note 88, at 8. See also Williams, supra note 67, at 10 (“Diversity of 
programming should result because the radio industry is still dependent on niche  
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The results of studies of whether source consolidation increases 
viewpoint diversity through niche radio formats are mixed. Drushel’s 1998 
study of the top fifty radio markets suggests that the number of niche 
formats has increased slightly from 1992 to 1997, and the results are 
statistically significant.119 However, Drushel also demonstrated that this 
increase was not related to source concentration, and the study was 
performed too soon to adequately measure the effects of the 1996 Act.120 In 
addition, Todd Chambers’s 2001 study of small markets suggested that 
niche formats in those markets are generally unaffected by the 1996 Act’s 
deregulation.121 The FCC itself recognizes the danger of relying on niche 
radio formats as evidence that deregulation of radio is working. Newly 
appointed FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein recently spoke about the 
tendency of the radio industry to create niche formats that are different in 
name only, not in content.122 Because of the shifting definition of a “niche 
format,” any claims of increased viewpoint diversity resulting from niche 
formats created by source consolidation would be premature at best without 
further study. 
Furthermore, the effect of source consolidation on viewpoint diversity 
in radio news programming is also mixed. Some studies have theorized that 
source consolidation would result in a “corporate” news format in which 
radio stations do not maintain their own news wires, while other studies 
show that news programming would be unaffected.123 Chambers’s 2001 
study found that deregulation has had a negative effect, but not statistically 
significant, on radio news outlets in small markets, and has led to a loss of 
1.6 radio news wires per year in small markets since 1996.124 Again, the 
effects of source consolidation are tentative enough to warrant caution, 
rather than wholesale approval, regarding the consolidation that has 
occurred since the 1996 Act. Thorough studies of the 1996 Act’s effects on 
format and news diversity should be conducted before lauding the 1996 Act 
as a complete success, or before the passage of any further legislation that 
is likely to result in source consolidation. 
 
programming and localism. If programming diversity results from duopolies, then radio 
audiences will benefit from them.”). 
 119. Drushel, supra note 88, at 14. 
 120. Id. at 18. 
 121. Chambers, supra note 95, at 309. 
 122. FCC Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, The Last DJ?: Finding a Voice on Media 
Ownership, Remarks at the Future of Music Coalition Policy Summit 2003 (Jan. 6, 2003), at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Adelstein/2003/spjsa301.html. 
 123. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 26. 
 124. Chambers, supra note 95, at 308. 
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B. Competition Analysis 
The 1996 Act’s push to consolidation has not significantly advanced 
competition, the FCC’s other guiding principle. The radio market 
traditionally has been “in a state of monopolistic competition, in which 
there are many owners of stations that appear similar to advertisers and 
audiences.”125 Station owners naturally want to increase their size because 
much of a radio station’s costs are fixed, meaning that costs are incurred 
whether advertising revenues increases or audiences increase.126 Therefore, 
station owners have an incentive to own a number of stations to take 
advantage of economies of scale.127 This often forces station owners to 
merge with or buy existing local stations because “the number of radio 
stations in lucrative markets is fixed.”128 Station owners also have 
incentives to expand nationally in order to take advantage of the benefits of 
owning several stations in the same format, including savings on format 
research and production of playlists and jingles.129 
Nonetheless, the economic health of all radio stations is not assured 
by ownership consolidation. In the early analysis of the 1996 Act’s effects, 
smaller ownership groups became less viable after consolidation.130 
Furthermore, the effect of station consolidation on other industries, such as 
advertising and music, has been problematic. Under consolidation, 
advertisers have fewer sellers from whom to buy access to audiences. The 
result is that advertising revenue in the top fifty radio markets is increasing 
more quickly than retail sales; additionally, revenue is increasing more 
quickly in those markets that are more heavily concentrated.131 Although 
national format oligopolies are giving radio conglomerates unique access to 
particular types of audiences across the country, which might benefit 
advertisers (and in turn allows the stations the ability to manipulate 
advertising rates more easily), this may not be much of an advantage when 
the majority of advertising earnings (approximately 80%) are derived from 
local advertising.132 
The music industry has been affected by consolidation as well. Just as 
format oligopolies offered advertisers unique access to a particular 
 
 125. Drushel, supra note 88, at 6 (citation omitted). 
 126. Id. at 5. 
 127. Id. (citation omitted). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Wirth, supra note 96, at 251. 
 130. Drushel, supra note 88, at 16. 
 131. Id. at 18. 
 132. Wirth, supra note 96, at 252-53. It is important to note that, for all the advantages of 
being able to manipulate advertising rates, specializing in a particular format is a risky 
strategy if the format becomes unpopular. Id. at 253. 
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audience, so too do oligopolies offer the music industry a way to market 
music product to a targeted audience.133 Radio stations then have the 
leverage to demand perks such as concert tickets, station performances, and 
other promotional exclusives; the savings from these perks can be used for 
station giveaways that further enhance a station’s popularity (and hurt its 
competitors).134 Vertical integration of radio stations also has touched the 
music industry, as some station owners such as Clear Channel now own 
many major concert venues for which music industry players must bargain 
for entry.135 The power of certain station owners to “make or break” certain 
artists has even lead to the revival of the early rock-era practice of 
“payola,” with the modification that stations state up front that certain 
songs have been “paid for” by record labels anxious to be heard on popular 
stations.136 Thus, even if the marketplace model is healthy for certain large 
radio corporations, it may be draining the vigor from the advertising and 
music industries, which will inevitably harm the radio industry in the long 
term. 
The perceived negative effects of consolidation on the radio, 
advertising, and music industries have not gone unnoticed in the political 
spectrum. Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold has voiced concern over the 
power of radio corporations in the context of campaign finance reform. In 
Senator Feingold’s opinion, “[T]he elimination of the national radio 
ownership caps and relaxation of local ownership caps [has] triggered a 
wave of consolidation and caused harm to consumers, artists, concert goers, 
local radio station owners and promoters.”137 Feingold’s Competition in 
Radio and Concert Industries Act, introduced on June 27, 2002, addresses  
 
 
 
 133. For an artist’s perspective on the music marketing process, including marketing to 
radio stations, see Steven Page, The Barenaked Truth About the Music Biz, THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL, Apr. 13, 2002 (on file with Journal). 
 134. Wirth, supra note 96, at 252. 
 135. Clear Channel Communications Web site, at http://www.clearchannel.com/ 
entertainment/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2002). 
 136. About.com’s Music Industry Glossary, at http://musicians.about.com/library/ 
glossary/P/bldef-payola.htm?terms=payola (defining payola as “[a] system of bribery 
developed in the 1950s through which record labels increased airplay of their artists by 
paying radio station managers and program directors”). See generally David E. Thigpen, Is 
That a Song or a Sales Pitch?, TIME, Aug. 3, 1998, at 73. There are, however, indications 
that record companies are becoming unwilling to pay what radio stations are demanding. 
Eric Boehlert, The “Bootylicious” Gambit, SALON.COM, June 5, 2001, at 
http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/06/05/sony_payola/. 
 137. Senator Russ Feingold, Statement on Market Concentration in the Radio, Concert, 
and Promotion Industries (June 13, 2002), at http://feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/ 
speeches/02/06/2002613529.html. 
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practices such as payola and multiple ownership of radio stations within a 
local market.138 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The FCC’s submission to the marketplace model of radio regulation 
twenty years ago did not erase its public interest mandate, or its 
commitment to diversity and competition. Yet, the FCC’s deregulatory zeal 
in the name of the marketplace model, coupled with the passage of the 
1996 Act, has resulted in massive station ownership consolidation that has 
not clearly advanced the public interest, diversity, or competition—in fact, 
the results are mixed at best, or negative at worst. Because consolidation 
continues to increase since the passage of the 1996 Act, more research 
should be done into its effects on diversity and competition before the FCC 
advocates any further deregulation. Moreover, the FCC should consider 
ownership consolidation’s effects on other industries—including the 
advertising and music industries—before concluding that any positive 
economic effects of consolidation for radio stations are sufficient to 
condone consolidation as economically healthy. 
Fortunately, the FCC is doing just that. In October 2001, FCC 
Chairman Michael Powell formed a Media Ownership Working Group to 
strengthen the “factual foundation” of the FCC’s media regulatory 
policies.139 As a part of this fact-finding mission, the FCC released several 
studies in October 2002. These studies found: 
• An increase in both media outlets (television, radio, 
newspapers, cable, and DBS) and media owners since 1960; 
 
 
 138. Press Release, Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold Introduces “Competition in Radio 
and Concert Industries Act” (June 27, 2002), at http://feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/ 
releases/02/06/062702medcon.html (currently pending in the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, where it was referred in June 2002). 
 139. Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Michael Powell Announces Creation of Media 
Ownership Working Group (Oct. 29, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/ 
News_Releases/2001/nrmc0124.html. Chairman Powell noted the shaky factual foundation 
of current regulations: 
For too long, the Commission has made sweeping media policy decisions without 
a contemporaneous picture of the media market. We need to rigorously examine 
whether current forms of media regulation are achieving the Commission’s policy 
objectives, and how changes in regulations would affect the policy goals of 
competition, diversity, and localism. 
Id. The FCC also scheduled a February 2003 hearing on the issue of media ownership to 
supplement the information it was gaining from the studies. Press Release, FCC, FCC 
Chairman Michael Powell Announces Public Hearing in Richmond, Va. on Media 
Ownership (Dec. 4, 2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
229209A1.doc. 
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• A decrease in the average number of radio stations per market 
from 1996 (13.5) to 2002 (9.9); 
• No statistically significant change in the number of formats 
per market; 
• An increase in the advertising share of the largest station 
owners per market (35.6% of advertising revenue in 1996 to 
46.8% in 2002); 
• No relationship between advertising rates and national radio 
station concentration per owner.140 
Additionally, although its fact-finding mission is laudable, the FCC is 
also beginning to realize that bare economics and carefully worded studies 
are not enough to encompass the current market’s dearth of quality 
programming. As Commissioner Adelstein remarked: 
What becomes clear in reading these studies is that we cannot measure 
the effect of radio consolidation simply by calculating advertising 
revenues or the number of formats. Ownership consolidation in local 
markets by definition reduces competition and puts programming 
decisions into the hands of comparatively fewer, often national, 
players. Therefore, we must consider how consolidation affects the 
programming choices available to listeners and the level of local public 
affairs coverage.141 
Though a return to the trusteeship model of strict content regulation 
and small ownership caps may be premature, it is clear that the pendulum 
of deregulation has swung far too wide in the wrong direction. The FCC 
must continue to commit itself to studying the radio marketplace, both its 
economics and programming. This will almost certainly result in the 
reconsideration of the present marketplace free-for-all. 
 
 140. Press Release, FCC, FCC Releases Twelve Studies on Current Media Marketplace 
(Oct. 1, 2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A1.doc. 
Other recent studies confirm the consolidation trend noted in the FCC studies, but conclude 
that consolidation itself is inherently negative. Todd Shields, Music Coalition Reports Less 
Variety in Radio, MEDIAWEEK.COM (Nov. 18, 2002), at http://www.mediaweek.com/ 
mediaweek/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1763301. 
 141. Adelstein, supra note 122, at 5. 
